Company Tactical Groups
Historical context, composition, and limitations
As noted by as by Konrad Muzyka a couple of weeks ago, Russian Ground Forces are largely using company tactical groups or CTG’s. I thought this might be a good topic to cover next heading into the weekend.
Much ink has been spilled over battalion tactical groups or “BTGs” that I will try to avoid retreading excessively. I will briefly point out the idea of a tailored and reinforced combined arms battalion created from either a regiment or brigade is not a new one, even in the Soviet era. Much of the historical “roots” of Russian BTGs draw upon the utilization of forward detachments in the often overlooked (by the west at least) late World War Two Soviet offensives, namely Bagration and Manchuria. The concept was refined throughout the Cold War, with BTGs probably entering the Soviet military writings in the 1980s, as described in the works of Lester Grau.1 2
Since February, BTG’s have been seldom seen in combat and they seemed to be more brittle than initially thought, especially when facing determined opposition. In offensive actions, we have generally seen one or two at most acting in concert at a time to achieve a given tactical objective on relatively narrow fronts. Debate exists for why that is. At present, my opinion is it is due to a certain combination of logistical and terrain limitations, a desire to avoid high casualties, and difficulties at the operational command level. I will delve into BTG logistics at some point in the future. Suffice it to say for now though, a BTG probably has a typical endurance in intense combat of, at most, three days. This is even according to Russian sources. If higher echelon supply were working correctly, this could be extended, but we know there have been problems in that area. The fragile supply link between the forward echelons and rear areas has been extensively targeted by Ukraine using HIMARS and other long-range systems.
Regardless, at this point in the war, most Russian units no longer form fully-fledged BTG’s due to attrition. We should also note Russian sources largely indicate Ukraine is also using CTG’s for the same reason. I tend to agree with that assessment: losses have been high on both sides and both sides are attempting to find the best way to reconstitute forces that can be effective offensively. Ukraine seems to have the initiative heading into the winter and I support giving Ukraine all the weapons (yes, this includes ATACMS) they need to bring this conflict to a satisfactory conclusion. What is determined to be a satisfactory conclusion is a political question and should largely be left up to the Ukrainians.
Returning back to the topic at hand, what might a CTG look like? A Russian source in June described a Ukrainian CTG in terms that made it seem really more like a small BTG: 20 to 25 BMPs, 10 to 12 tanks, 6 to 12 self-propelled guns, up to 6 MLRS, and 250 to 450 personnel. These are described as supplemented by smaller “mobile groups” of 4 tanks and 3 BMPs, with a few technicals (somewhat humorously referred to as bandera-mobiles by the Russians).3 Back in 2016, InformNapalm noted a Russian CTG of the 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade as a command section, 3 BMP platoons, a tank platoon, a mortar battery, a self-propelled gun battery, a grenade launcher platoon, a medical squad, a MANPAD squad, a ZSU-23-4 squad, and an armored recovery vehicle squad.4 This adds up to 12 BMPs (9 in MR platoons, 3 in AGS platoon), 3 tanks, 3 30mm grenade launches, 8 120mm mortars with prime movers, 6 122 or 152mm self-propelled howitzers, a AC-4350 ambulance, a BTR (for the MANPAD squad), a ZSU-23-4 (more likely a 2S6), and a BREM-L. Around 200 personnel total. The strength of a CTG of this composition is artillery. The weakness is no organic sustainment.
The weakness could be mitigated by only using CTG’s for very brief periods (24 hours or so) to achieve a limited tactical goal, then pull them back to their parent higher echelon for resupply and refit. This higher echelon is likely at the regiment and brigade rather than the battalion level due to the aforementioned attrition. Hypothetically, a brigade HQ could rotate two or three CTG’s in and out of the front line over the course of a week. This rotation would, however, use up a lot of fuel. If the primary maneuver unit in use are CTG’s, their offensive limit of advance is largely limited by what the vehicles can carry with them: one combat load of ammunition (боекомплект) and a tank of gas. This can be only stretched so far and becomes riskier the deeper an offensive goes.
Just like BTG’s, CTG’s are not a new concept. The composition of a forward security element (FSE) for a Soviet motorized rifle regiment is basically the same as a CTG; the distances in Soviet doctrine might also give hints as to the distance a CTG would operate independently (25 to 40 km ahead of the main body). Prior to 2022, Russia would use CTG’s as the basis of minor training events leading up to the larger end-of-training cycle exercises. I’ve included a few examples, but there are many more.5 6 CTG’s were also used in 2008 in Georgia and can be found in a few references as reinforced companies.7 This goes to say that there is probably a wealth of doctrinal writings out there that I’m not scratching the surface of.
As for the next Substack topic, I’m leaning toward something related to Belarus. Either the Belarusian Armed Forces in general or the current buildup along the northern border of Ukraine. I have finished my initial draft of Russian logistics at the brigade level and down. I am not completely comfortable with the draft at the moment and looking for some peer feedback before I release it, either here or on a third-party site. My free time is opening up nicely though so I’m optimistic I will have another post up next week.
Lester Grau, The Soviet Combined Arms Battalion: Reorganization for Tactical Flexibility, U. S. Army Combined Arms Center, 1989, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA216368.pdf.
Lester Grau, Soviet Non-Linear Combat: The Challenge of the 90s, U. S. Army Combined Arms Center, 1990, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA231789.pdf.
“Armed Forces of Ukraine are fighting in small mobile groups, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are using new tactics to combat them,” Argumenti.ru, June 9, 2022, https://argumenti.ru/army/2022/06/775529.
“A document was found revealing the combat composition of the tactical group of the 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the RF Armed Forces,” InformNapalm.org, October 11, 2016, https://informnapalm.org/28361-boevoj-sostav-takticheskoj-gruppy-36/.
“The company tactical group secured the airfield in North Ossetia as part of a surprise check of combat readiness,” NRNews.ru, July 20, 2020, http://nrnews.ru/news/war-news/115194-rotnaya-takticheskaya-gruppa-obespechila-ohranu-aerodroma-v-severnoy-osetii-v-ramkah-vnezapnoy-proverki-boegotovnosti.html.
“The company tactical group of the 102nd base ‘repelled the offensive of a mock enemy’ at the Alagyaz training ground,” Razm.info, December 1, 2016, https://razm.info/ru/12869.
M.S. Barabanov, A.V. Lavrov, V.A. Tseluiko, Edited by R.N. Pukhov. Tanks of August, Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010, http://cast.ru/files/The_Tanks_of_August_sm_eng.pdf.
There is a very simple reason no BTG was seen at the start of the war. As I understand it, in peacetime the BTG is supposed to have all of it's equipment, and a limited number of Officers and technical specialists, all who are "contractors" or "full time" military. The point is, these are people who have committed to several years to learn the required skills. Roughly half of the BTG manpower, 200-250 men, is simple infantry and truck drivers who are normally "conscripts". Russia has limitation that conscripts are not LEGALLY ALLOWED to serve outside of the country. Conscripts are men who have been "drafted" at the start of the war. Since this "limited military operation" was not a declared war, not an "official" war there were no conscripts at the start of the operation. That meant that the BTGs went to war at half strength.
In part the lack of conscripts to fill out the BTGs was responsible for the 60 mile convoy to Kiev. There was no infantry to protect the flanks of the convoy from infantry with anti-tank missiles.
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It also can have another interesting impact in combat situations. If the russian command wants to CYA he can refuse to advance against even small Ukrainian blocking force. Doctrine says you need a 3:1 advantage to attack an enemy. A blocking force as small as 80-90 men could be enough to prevent a nominal "BTG" from advancing. While they would have 200-250 men to run the vehicles and technical equipment, they would have little or no infantry to protect the equipment from enemy infantry attack.
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Putin has been twisting russian laws into pretzels and rewriting them to make this war work. Since it is not an officially declared law he could not conscript more men. So he came up with the label "mobilizing". They are still really conscripts, but ... they are not treated as well as the "normal" twice yearly intakes of conscripts.
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So at the start of the war, the "BTGs" were chewed up and now they are playing catchup trying to replace men and equipment lost at the start. That is why he is now talking about a "pause" or even "peace". It would give him time to train the new conscripts and move them into places they are needed.
Just working at the level of theory, I've been thinking company-level combined arms groups are the future for some time. Mostly because the bigger a formation gets the easier it is to spot and target.
I'm gratified to see that my purely analytic approach is coming up with a similar org structure as working professionals. I suspect having artillery integrated at the company level won't work though, aside from mortars. Maybe have a battery explicitly tasked with supporting each line unit but not directly integrated with it since the logistics needs are so different?
Russian BTGs couldn't work right because of the way the Russian army personnel system appears to. Sounds like both sides are moving towards smaller formations, just like I thought would happen in any major ground fight like this, because of drone surveillance and network connections.
War never changes, but certain parameters sure flex from era to era.
Basic operating principle going forward, I think, is that you need to have the most capabilities packaged into the smallest independent units. But decentralized logistics, probably drone based, are gonna be crucial for resupply. Wonder if Ukraine can reboot the way it does its organization in time to counterattack against whatever Russia tries in the next few weeks before the mud season.