Hello all, it’s been almost six months so I figured it’s time to post on social media again. In all seriousness, I have been extremely busy with various projects and life changes, here’s a quick rundown of what’s been going on before I get into the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive.
For the Russian casualties estimates, there were many delays, some of my own making, and a few unavoidable personal emergencies amongst the Swiss team from NZZ that I have had the pleasure of working with. However, that is all been worked through now and NZZ should be running the story in the next few days. I will avoid giving much detail about the story for now, but in short, my estimates generally coincide with the conservative end of western estimates. The numbers I generated run from February 2022 to the end of February 2023 so are, of course, somewhat outdated at this point. More to come on that when the story runs.
I have been working on creating a business with a few other individuals for the past few months. I cannot give too many details about this one either, but it does entail me keeping a close eye on events in Ukraine for the foreseeable future.
I am moving to a new house, not out of Kansas or anything, but about 120 miles north to the small town of Abilene. Abilene is most well known for being the hometown of Dwight Eisenhower and his presidential library is there. The move should be in the next week. Try to resist the temptation to geolocate my exact grid.
Now that is out of the way, the counter offensive.
Ultimately, the Ukrainians appear to have chosen to launch their main attack in the south. Given Ukraine’s long term strategic goals and Russia’s defensive preparations, the counteroffensive’s general geographical direction was widely anticipated publicly. Russia defenses are dense all across the front and breaching them at any particular point would have required a large massing of forces difficult to conceal from both the public and Russian ISR.
In my estimation, Ukraine is trying to divert and fix Russian forces away from the south while simultaneously moving more of their own forces to Zaporizhia Oblast. These Ukrainian operations, such as their ongoing attacks around Bakhmut, the well-publicized incursions into Belgorod Oblast, and the staging of boats along the Dnipro could be described as shaping operations for the main ongoing offensive. Shaping operations are designed to create favorable conditions for a decisive operation. There are large elements of the VDV that are still engaged in Bakhmut and possibly a few in Belgorod as well; Ukraine’s current actions there perhaps are aimed at preventing these high-quality units from being moved south. Along the Dnipro, Ukraine’s staging of amphibious assets and small crossing attempts could be viewed as a demonstration, that is, a show of force designed to deceive the enemy. Keeping up this activity over the past several months probably forced at least a few of Russia’s units away from the decisive operation. The flooding has probably nullified this operational effect for now, but once the waters recede, Russian commanders will have to account for it to some extent. Much like the hypothetical Russian attack out of Belarus over the winter, I do not see a major crossing attempt as “currently” viable, especially considering how many forces Ukraine has moved to their decisive effort.
The size of the force Ukraine is committing to the offensive is variable depending on the source. For my part, if one is counting from the east side of the Dnipro to the Velyka Novosilka area, the number is probably around 15 Ukrainian brigades in the area depicted below (credit to the Black Bird Group on Twitter for their map). This number is predominately derived from pro-Russian public social media that I cannot verify completely but seems to be a realistic count. Pro-Russian social media becomes unreliable once you get into the details, namely, how much Ukraine is committing to the first echelon and how many losses they are sustaining thus far.
According to pro-Russian Telegram channels, the 15 Ukrainian brigades are organized into at least three higher headquarters: 9th Army Corps, 10th Army Corps, and Tactical Group “Marun”. 9th Army Corps is reportedly in the first echelon, currently fighting on the front lines. The 10th Army Corps and Tactical Group “Marun” are in the second echelon, yet to be committed. The second echelon consists of possibly six or more brigades, including a tank brigade and several elite air assault units. Again, this is derived from pro-Russian social media, so to be taken with some skepticism. The reasoning keeping me from identifying most of the Ukrainian brigades is that I have some doubts about the accuracy of some of the details so I am already working in some skepticism into my analysis.
There is also certainly a level of exaggeration present when it comes to reading the postings of Russian war correspondents. Over the past several days, they have described Ukraine as attacking with hundreds of armored vehicles. For instance, one narrative that was circulated was a brigade or larger attack coming out of the Orikhiv area. The attack was described as four columns of 30 to 40 vehicles each, up to 120 vehicles in total. Looking through the footage, you do see columns, but they appear to be more in line with what would expect from a company-sized element: around 10 vehicles. So what was described as a brigade-sized attack was perhaps something closer to a battalion, with three or four company groups. If the Russians had footage of a brigade-sized attack getting repulsed, they would have shown it. The Ukrainians are probably attacking with elements of several brigades at various points, but probably no larger than one battalion at any given time and place. How many of these battalion-level attacks have occurred so far is anyone’s guess. Artillery is the main threat to both sides as is the pattern in the conflict thus far.
This is not to say the Ukrainians are not taking significant losses. The footage of damaged Leopard 2 main battle tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles is being widely circulated. My main concern with the overall footage thus far is the confirmation that the Ukrainian 47th Mechanized Brigade is involved in the current fighting. Previously, I believed this unit would be held back until an initial breakthrough had been achieved. It suggests the Ukrainians are encountering more resistance in penetrating the disruption zone in front of the main Russian defense line than was expected. Ukraine is also having significant difficulty in creating wide gaps in Russian minefields, leading to vehicle clustering. From the Russian side, several regular ground force units, including the 42nd Guards and 127th Motorized Rifle Divisions are proving to be more effective than some of their more well-heralded compatriots in the 1st Guards Tank Army, amongst others. Given the presence of these two units and the resistance being offered thus far, it seems probable that the majority of the 58th and 5th Combined Arms Armies are involved.
Russian losses are probably significant as well. Various Russian war correspondents describe the situation variably as “hard” or “difficult”. As soon as Ukraine seems to gain an initial foothold, Russian forces in the area launch local counterattacks to regain their previous positions. If Ukraine achieves success in its counteroffensive this year, it will almost certainly come at a substantial cost. There is not an exact historic parallel for estimating the losses that might be incurred for penetrating dense defensive belts in the present day. Thousand of casualties, both Ukrainian and Russian, seem likely to occur in the coming weeks. If the Ukrainians breakthrough reaches the prewar borders might be achievable in the medium to long term. If they do not, the odds of a frozen conflict increase substantially. Both sides know this. This is hopefully not to come off as being overly pessimistic, but the West needs to be realistic in what to expect. War is brutal and the public has never had such open access to seeing it in near real-time. Ukrainian equipment will need to be replaced and maintaining popular support and political will for the continuing supply of arms to allow Ukraine to defend their country is paramount. Unrealistic expectations of a quick victory with no losses will erode these efforts.
On that cheery note, I hope everyone has a nice weekend. I should be settled into my new location next week. Next time I will probably cover either the first-year casualty estimates or go into more tactical/operational detail about the counteroffensive as information emerges.
Solid analysis, thanks!
If I were the UKR commander I'd be sure to commit a few high-end units in the early probes to encourage the enemy to believe *this* is the main thrust. Would not be at all surprised if we don't see the real punch for another week or two. That Swedish-trained and equipped brigade finishing its training cycle could be the vanguard of the true big push.
With the first reported battles coming in areas where UKR forces knew they would face heavy resistance, I sense a deep play on Kyiv's part. Not to say they're wasting lives - defenses have to be tested and this is the only way - but the more Moscow is encouraged to mass forces in any single place, the more vulnerable its field units and logistics become.
Good objective analysis. My initial thoughts based on open source analysis is that the Russian defensive lines are quite formidable as one would expect given their large amount of time to prepare. Brigade level breaching operations are incredibly complex. I suspect that the UA doesn't have the training to accomplish this nor do they have air sufficient air support or artillery mobility experience on the offensive. Will they be tempted to simply force the positions? Old habits die hard. It's early days but the cynic in me is wondering if the West purposely dragged their feet supplying eqpt and that there's a napkin somewhere with the new borders already drawn. I hope I am wrong.