The current probability of a Russian winter offensive out of Belarus: Low

Russia's ground force posture in Belarus as of 22 December

Having been observing the general situation in Belarus for the past few weeks, I am still assessing the likelihood of a Russian ground offensive from Belarus this winter is low. The likelihood of the Belarusian military directly joining the conflict is also still low at this time. The current ground activity in Belarus is still interesting and probably does have a few operational goals in mind (from the Russian perspective) which I will go into. Russian movements into and around Belarus should still be closely monitored in the event the situation changes. If the situation does change significantly as Russia moves additional forces around, I will be sure to take to Twitter.

For some background on me personally and my underlying motives, I have had an academic interest in Belarus for the past few years, mostly in the realm of international relations study for my graduate program at Norwich. I visited Belarus briefly in 2020, right before the COVID pandemic and around Mike Pompeo’s meeting with Lukashenko (a coincidence). Some of you may have geolocated my profile picture to the Stalin Line museum outside of Minsk. I would ultimately like to see an independent Belarus, not necessarily in NATO or the EU, but one able to act as a quasi-neutral third party that would serve as an avenue for dialogue between east and west. My opinions are thus largely similar to the opinions and goals of many Belarusian opposition figures. The Belarusian people, like every other country, should decide what form of government they should have at the end of the day. We are a long way away from that goal and, again, in my opinion, Russia’s military must be decisively defeated first before renewed diplomatic dialogue can begin, either with Moscow or Minsk. This should not really need to be said, but I have no official relationship with any government organization, American or otherwise, and my views should not be construed as any sort of official policy.

Getting back off my soapbox, this is what I have been able to establish about Russia’s current ground force posture in Belarus as of 22 December. I initially started covering Belarusian forces in this as well, but this became very long, very quickly.

Locations of the reports below

• The main Russian concentration continues to be at the Obuz-Lesnovsky Training Area (53.055556, 25.735000), near Baranavichy with approximately one to two regiments or brigade-sized elements based on the number of tents and vehicles present as of mid-December. This group is approximately 4,000 personnel, possibly more. This almost certainly includes a sizable portion of the Russian 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army based on unit patches and the rail traffic observed.¹ ² This unit was present at Sumy and Izium earlier in the war. They have been attrited to some extent and are likely training newly mobilized personnel at the training area. Based on the number of T-80s observed in other reports, it is possible that some of 4th Guards Tank Division may also be present, though this needs further confirmation. Equipment makeup alone is no longer enough to definitively identify units due to losses sustained. Konrad Muzyka and I did some imagery analysis on the area over the past few weeks. Konrad noted a company’s worth of BMDs there, having seen the baseline imagery, I agree with that identification. We’re not exactly sure what it means but they may have been pulled from the Belarusian reserve depot at Urech'ye.

  Henry Schlottman @HN_Schlottman

  02DEC imagery indicates >300 vehicles and tents for 3-4k personnel present at the Obuz-Lesnovsky Training Area (TA), Belarus. Reported on in NOV by RFERL: rferl.org/a/satellite-im… Current reporting indicates some of this force departed for Brest TA (no imagery available yet)

  

  

• One to two Russian battalions are present at Losvido/Lasvida Training Area (55.318389, 29.996917) as indicated by social media reporting and December imagery analysis from Konrad Muzyka. I will leave the recent specifics to Konrad to discuss in his own reports. A moderate confidence assessment of around 500 to 1,000 Russian personnel.

• Another one to two Russian battalions are present at the Asipovichi Training Area. The imagery I have seen for this location is over a month old due to cloud cover.³ A low-confidence assessment for this location of around 1,000 Russian personnel. Belarusian forces are also possibly present.

• At least one, possibly two battalion-sized Russian armored elements are present at the Brest Training Area (52.012500, 23.739556). On the morning of 20 December, 23 T-80BVs with sustainment transloaded at Palonka station (53.121028, 25.732222), just north of the Obuz-Lesnovsky Training Area.⁴ This element initially went to Luninets and later backtracked to head towards Brest. Since this is predominately a tank unit, I estimate this element is around 150 personnel. Separately, a train with 20 BMP-2s and several supporting vehicles was observed at Kalinkavichy station on 20 December, possibly en route to Brest.⁵

  Similar to Asipovichi, cloud cover is currently a problem when it comes to imagery. All told, perhaps 500 Russian personnel are present at Brest. Belarusian forces are also likely active at this training area.

  The Lookout @The_Lookout_N

  Stills from a video released by the Russian MoD on exercises at the Brestsky Training Ground - Belarus, involving T-80BVs, if I'm not mistaken. function.mil.ru/news_page/coun… https://t.co/rbxdhcdaj3

  

• Russians possibly remain at the Zaslonovo/Lepelski Training Area (54.905056, 28.919083). Russian forces have been present since mid-October here in at least battalion strength. On 8 December, 13 T-72 tanks were shipped from the 22nd Tank Reserve Base, arriving at Zaslonovo on 10 December.⁶ On the morning of 20 December, 31 tanks (reportedly a mix of T-72B3s and T-80s) and 15 other vehicles transloaded, heading initially toward Asipovichy and Slutsk before joining the other Russian forces at Obuz-Lesnovsky on 21 December.⁷ Given the unknowns with this location currently, I think a low confidence estimate might be 150 to 500 personnel still present at Zaslonovo at this time. It may be empty now due to the recent movement.

• Air-defense and sustainment elements are still present at Zyabrovka airfield (52.305972, 31.163639) as indicated by early-December imagery analysis from Konrad Muzyka and Jiri Jicha. This presence is reduced from earlier in the year and is probably no more than a couple of hundred personnel.

• Unidentified Russian elements are likely at Luninets Airfield (52.275778, 26.787694), where tents and revetments have been constructed over the past months. There are enough tents there for approximately 200 personnel, though the buildings at the airbase could accommodate more. The presence there is possibly a mix of sustainment, air defense, and engineering troops.

  Scil @scil_int

  Luninets airbase. Roughly one year timelapse. The expansion has been immense with a total around 1km² cleared of forest, 0.3km² in building process. Note also as of late the 115x30m hall erected at (52.277968, 26.784274).

• Unidentified Russian elements are possibly present at Chepelevo Training Area (53.053361, 25.428861). There is not much reporting or imagery for this location, I would offer another low confidence assessment that a company to a battalion-sized unit is there or 100 to 300 personnel. Konrad Muzyka and I discussed this location briefly, it may be a Belarusian unit there.

Not included: There are Russian aircraft and air force personnel likely present at airfields scattered around the country, such as the Machulishchy (53.777667, 27.577556) and Lida (53.877722, 25.376639). Small Russian sustainment detachments may be present at various equipment and ammunition depots in Belarus. In some cases, as Russia is bringing vehicles into Belarus, they are also taking ammunition out.⁸ There are a number of S-400 SAM batteries and Iskander SSM systems in Belarus which are hard to track. And of course, the two permanent Russian strategic communications facilities in Belarus are staffed as well.

All told, the number of Russian military personnel present in Belarus is probably around 10,000. This number has been cited by a number of western media and government sources but now the reader has a better idea of the dispersal: about half are at Obuz-Lesnovsky, and the rest are spread out in 500 to 1,000 sized groupings. Some western sources say the total is around 15,000.⁹ The pro-Russian community has various narratives going on, one of the more prevalent is that the 10 to 15 thousand number is a large underestimate. For the first battle of Kyiv, Russia had about 20,000 to 30,000 personnel present on a relatively narrow front along the Belarusian border. Now, in my estimation, they have somewhere between 1/3 to 1/2 of that number scattered at various training areas throughout Belarus.

This was all relatively easy to track and observe in imagery, despite it being winter. The Russians in Belarus continue to park their vehicles and tents in the open at known points in training areas with zero to minimal attempts at camouflage. They also timed their rail loading operations for several battalions to align with a high-profile political visit by Putin, Lavrov, and Shoigu to Minsk. This, to me, points to a coordinated military deception (maskirovka) operation, likely intended to fix a certain portion of Ukraine’s ground forces away from the eastern front. By contrast, the concentration of Russian forces is much more difficult to observe where the fighting is actively occurring near Bakhmut. Another aspect of this may be to gauge the effectiveness of western and Ukrainian intelligence gathering and response. I personally would be more concerned about the military threat from Belarus if there were significant portions of Russian units coming in that I could not find. Right now, there are not: they are all showing up at the training areas. Belarus offers a relatively safe haven, with large military training areas and ammunition depots, while still being close enough to Ukraine to be of some operational value, even if it is passive.

There is the possibility of reflexive control, in which Russia is intentionally creating the appearance of weakness to lessen our guard against the possibility of a ground offensive out of Belarus. This is why it is critical to gauge what capabilities the Russian forces have in Belarus as accurately as possible. OSINT can present a partial picture but there may be gaps. There is a notable minimal amount of artillery and engineering assets in the movements observed thus far. The Russian heavy-tracked equipment in Belarus is largely still far enough away from the Ukrainian border that rail movement would be much preferred over road movement to save on fuel and maintenance. This adds a day, probably two or three, in warning time. It is possible, but somewhat unlikely, that Russia has been able to concentrate additional significant combat forces in Belarus that we have not observed, but I have moderate confidence in the OSINT community’s ability to track battalion-sized and higher-echelon movements at this point. If I had the assets that a nation-state has, my confidence would be higher. There will always be some measure of uncertainty that comes from only using unclassified methods.

The terrain along the Belarusian-Western Ukrainian border is also generally poor for mechanized forces, a fact that might be able to be overcome if Russia had operational surprise and were to concentrate substantial engineering support and utilize air mobility operations effectively. They attempted to do this the first time around, with more forces than they currently have in Belarus and with the majority of the VDV. They came perhaps closer to succeeding than is general public knowledge, but Russia no longer has an intact VDV to use. Russian motorized rifle units also occasionally train in air assault operations, but not in anything much bigger than the company level. The terrain north of Chernihiv is a little better, but right now Russia is postured more towards the western side of the Dnipro. A significant and successful offensive from Belarus at this stage would require a high degree of operational skill, deception, and ingenuity. Russia, and the Soviets before, have historically shown this at times, but this conflict has largely shown they need deep reforms at all levels. And many of the junior and mid-level officers who perhaps could have pulled this off are likely casualties by now. If I am wrong about this assessment over the course of the winter, we’ll come back to it later and examine it as a case of Russian operational deception gone right.

If Belarus were to become an active participant, theoretically, it could make up for some of the capability gaps Russia currently has in terms of numbers. I have utilized a few of my resources to gather atmospherics and, largely, the internal consensus is that the Belarusian military is not particularly keen to become further embroiled in Russia’s war. I would not expect an uprising or anything of that nature if Lukashenko orders them in, but the amount that they would contribute to a largely Russian-led offensive does not appear to currently outweigh the domestic and international risks Belarus would be taking. Lukashenko may have made the same calculation and Moscow may be willing to let Belarus sit this one out mostly rather than risk any sort of destabilization. Belarus is also given Russia a significant portion of its ammunition stockpile, which would probably be needed if it were to enter the war.

For my next topic, I may go with one of these, in no particular order

• Where does American public support realistically stand on Ukraine, especially in light of the newly divided US Congress?

• The thorny subject of casualty estimates

• The recreation of the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts

• An off-cycle Zapad-23 exercise

1. Belarus Hajan Project, Telegram, 15 October 2022, https://t.me/Hajun_BY/5548.

2. Community of Railroad Workers of Belarus, Telegram, 8 November 2022, https://t.me/belzhd_live/1987.

3. “Satellite Images Show A Russian Buildup In Belarus. Experts Say It May Be A Bluff,” RFERL, 8 November 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/satellite-images-russia-buildup-belarus/32121143.html.

4. Belarus Hajan Project, Twitter, 20 December 2022, Link.

5. Belarus Hajan Project, Twitter, 22 December 2022, Link.

6. Community of Railroad Workers of Belarus, Telegram, 12 December 2022, https://t.me/belzhd_live/2056.

7. Belarus Hajan Project, Twitter, 21 December 2022, Link.

8. Community of Railroad Workers of Belarus, Telegram, 2 November 2022, https://t.me/belzhd_live/1978.

9. Liz Sly, “Ukrainian fears grow of a new Russian invasion from Belarus,” Washington Post, 19 December 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/19/ukrainian-fears-grow-new-russian-invasion-belarus/.