Totally off topic. My FIL was Army CIC, late husband also retired AF officer. I have been concerned for quite some time about Gen. Austin. My understanding of the civilian-military relationship would never see a military person as Sec Def, just as we would never see a civilian as one of the Joint Chiefs, because a military officer *never* is to be put in a position to outrank the highest civilians. Can you give me some references to explore the dynamics between these positions in wartime, that we seem to be heading towards? I feel it was done for a specific reason, that has been buried or glossed over.
Brilliant! All this tracks extremely well with what I've observed analyzing the conflict from a more strategic/operational bent. Lot more going on and the fighting a lot more evenly matched in some domains than most media are willing to admit.
Can't help but wonder how the post mobilization org will look. Are they reverting back to Soviet-style OOBs across the board? Next offensive might look something out of a textbook... from 1985. Never thought I'd live to see Red Storm Rising in real life.
The BTGs, more or less, went out the window by late summer I think. At that point they cease really being a useful metric and then you also have to start accounting for the Russian partial mobilization and return to a more conventional structure. The British posted that in one of their updates I believe and matches what we had seen elsewhere. It's hard to tell how much is currently being held back by both the Russians and the Ukrainians for the upcoming spring battles.
Yeah no clue on who can truly tell what's happening at fine scales on either side. I have to imagine radar and thermal sensors on satellites give a sense of major buildups as they happen, but sooner or later Russia has got to figure out how to disperse units across an area to avoid detection during buildups... at least, you'd think.
Dude who runs the blog militaryland.net sees new UKR brigades appearing on social media, Rochan (I think) has suggested up to 8 in the past, so with about 40 (excluding the territorials) BDEs presently running I'd bet at least 1/5 of Ukraine's active forces are kept in strategic reserve - https://militaryland.net/news/ukraine-is-forming-new-brigades/
As for Russia, I have to think there's a strike force 50,000 strong assembling beyond NATO radar surveillance that hasn't appeared on the board. Whether it comes down east or west of Kharkiv or gets fed into Donbas is something I suspect we'll learn in a few days.
Basic assumption for the fighting ahead: Ukraine loses ground but chews up the next wave, then the full-scale counteroffensive begins in June (or whenever the mud clears).
Dear Henry, not sure if someone has pointed this out before. You might want to check the copy-editing of the headline of your whole Substack..
Totally off topic. My FIL was Army CIC, late husband also retired AF officer. I have been concerned for quite some time about Gen. Austin. My understanding of the civilian-military relationship would never see a military person as Sec Def, just as we would never see a civilian as one of the Joint Chiefs, because a military officer *never* is to be put in a position to outrank the highest civilians. Can you give me some references to explore the dynamics between these positions in wartime, that we seem to be heading towards? I feel it was done for a specific reason, that has been buried or glossed over.
Brilliant! All this tracks extremely well with what I've observed analyzing the conflict from a more strategic/operational bent. Lot more going on and the fighting a lot more evenly matched in some domains than most media are willing to admit.
Can't help but wonder how the post mobilization org will look. Are they reverting back to Soviet-style OOBs across the board? Next offensive might look something out of a textbook... from 1985. Never thought I'd live to see Red Storm Rising in real life.
Great work! Much appreciated.
The BTGs, more or less, went out the window by late summer I think. At that point they cease really being a useful metric and then you also have to start accounting for the Russian partial mobilization and return to a more conventional structure. The British posted that in one of their updates I believe and matches what we had seen elsewhere. It's hard to tell how much is currently being held back by both the Russians and the Ukrainians for the upcoming spring battles.
Yeah no clue on who can truly tell what's happening at fine scales on either side. I have to imagine radar and thermal sensors on satellites give a sense of major buildups as they happen, but sooner or later Russia has got to figure out how to disperse units across an area to avoid detection during buildups... at least, you'd think.
Dude who runs the blog militaryland.net sees new UKR brigades appearing on social media, Rochan (I think) has suggested up to 8 in the past, so with about 40 (excluding the territorials) BDEs presently running I'd bet at least 1/5 of Ukraine's active forces are kept in strategic reserve - https://militaryland.net/news/ukraine-is-forming-new-brigades/
As for Russia, I have to think there's a strike force 50,000 strong assembling beyond NATO radar surveillance that hasn't appeared on the board. Whether it comes down east or west of Kharkiv or gets fed into Donbas is something I suspect we'll learn in a few days.
Basic assumption for the fighting ahead: Ukraine loses ground but chews up the next wave, then the full-scale counteroffensive begins in June (or whenever the mud clears).