Ukraine's Counteroffensive: Part III
Over the past week, Prigozhin dominated the headlines, but there were a few military developments relating to the course of the counteroffensive.1
Ukraine significantly increased the intensity of its targeting of Russian supply lines, notably striking the bridges at Chonhar, likely with a UK-supplied Storm-Shadow missile.
Ukrainian forces increased their activity along the Dnipro River. There is a small Ukrainian force (estimates range from a platoon to a company) that has a foothold near the Antonovskiy Bridge. Russia is trying to dislodge them but has not been able to as of the morning of 26 June.
The Ukrainian 31st Mechanized Brigade posted a video from the small village of Rivnopil', apparently confirming the Ministry of Defense's announcement of the settlement being liberated.
Separate from the main offensive in the south, Ukraine made some gains around Bakhmut. The 3rd Assault Brigade eliminated a small bridgehead over the Siversky Donets - Donbas canal defended by a battalion from the Russian 57th Motor Rifle Brigade.
The targeting of Russian logistical support is probably most indicative of how the Ukrainian counteroffensive will develop over the course of the next few weeks. Besides the bridges at Chonhar, Ukraine also hit a Russian base and railway bridge at Yakymivka and a railway station at Rykove. There might also be an increase in partisan targeting of rail lines in general in the south, but this would fall more in the lines of “unconfirmed” reporting as I haven’t seen any footage.
In my opinion, Ukraine is probably not going to be able to breach the main Russian defense belts until Russian supplies are depleted substantially. We are already seeing encouraging signs, several Russian units on the frontlines are asking for key items, such as drones, optics, and even repair tools. As these reports multiply and their forces slowly grind their way toward the first main defense line, Ukraine may decide to commit the large forces they have held in reserve thus far. Then the offensive will likely develop at a much more rapid pace.
In terms of attrition, the picture appears to be broadly similar to last week. Both sides report significant losses. The total number of vehicles destroyed posted on social media is even closer than it was last week. Naalsio on Twitter continues to update his list of visually confirmed losses.2 The below graphic is from his data.
I noted the pitfalls of using social media as the only indicator of relative loss rates last week. Ukrainian forces have verifiably shifted to more infantry-centric attacks over the past week, as evidenced by both their own footage and pro-Russian Telegram. This means Ukraine may still be losing personnel at a high rate, despite the evidence of a plateau in the data. I continue to assess Ukraine took significant losses in the initial stages of the offensive, but the Russian forces are likely taking losses at a similar rate presently. Whichever force has the most reserves and is also able to maintain its supply lines will likely succeed.
Overall, I think we can say the Russians are still fighting hard, but weaknesses in their supply chain are starting to emerge. Ukraine is no doubt aware of this. Ukrainian forces may also have its own logistical problems but these are less reported. Pure speculation here, but part of the reason for their shift toward infantry tactics may have been to preserve fuel for the eventual breakthrough attempt.
Concurrent with operations in the main sector of the offensive, Ukraine is starting to test the strength of the Russian forces along the Dnipro. Last week, I tweeted that the 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment of the 7th Guard Air Assault Division may have relocated away from the Dnipro towards Zaporizhzhia.3 UK Defense Intelligence also put out the 34th Motor Rifle Brigade was moved away from the Dnipro. Russia is clearly moving some units away from the river, probably in response to Ukraine’s main offensive in Zaporizhzhia and western Donetsk Oblasts. If these units are being replaced by anyone else is unknown. Looking at Project Owl’s map4, the Russian units in the area of mixed quality. There are units like the bulk of the 7th Guards Air Assault Division and 10th Spetsnaz Brigade, but also a large number of various BARS and Territorial Defense units.
Ukraine put about a company of infantry across the river at the Antonivskyi Bridge several days ago. The Russian milblogger community seems to think this is a serious situation, to the point of trying to coordinate airstrikes via Telegram. I am not entirely convinced. Ukraine has put small groups of infantry across the river for several months so this may be nothing more than a reconnaissance mission. What would convince me that something major is developing is if Ukraine put up a pontoon bridge and started to mass mechanized units on the opposite side. On the other hand, the flooding has washed away some of the forward defenses the Russians have established. Either way, I do not think the Russians will risk weakening the Dnipro front much more than they already have. Another intriguing possibility might be further north, as the Kakhovka reservoir is nearly completely dry. Naturally, any sort of opposed river crossing has substantial risks, as the Russians found out at Bilohorivka last year.
Finally, the Ukrainians continue to conduct small attacks around Bakhmut and liquated a small bridgehead on the west side of the Siversky Donets - Donbas canal. There is some nervousness amongst the Russian milblogger community that they may eventually lose Bakhmut. I do not see that as a possibility in the near or medium term. If such a thing did happen, it would have a detrimental effect on Russian morale, given the blood they had to give to take it. The military effects would be somewhat less pronounced.
There are a few rumors of Ukrainian offensives developing in other sectors of the front, but to date, Russian milbloggers have not picked up on substantial Ukrainian unit movements that would support such an assessment. According to Russian sources, the bulk of Ukrainian reserves remain yet to be committed and are mainly postured in Zaporizhzhia and western Donetsk Oblasts.
I’m going to keep using the word counteroffensive and offensive more or less interchangeably, even though it might not be doctrinally correct.
https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=180u1IkUjtjpdJWnIC0AxTKSiqK4G6Pez&ll=46.49128034949556%2C32.70816358713613&z=10
Looking at sentinel imagery, the reservoir isn't suitable right now for heavy vehicles to drive on. There's some photos floating around that show it dried out...that's only the first few inches. There's also still channels of water in the middle of the reservoir. Late summer it might be dried out more, but (not being a hydrologist) the river is probably still going to be there even if the reservoir isn't.
Whoops edited. Guess I was thinking of Britannia and ruling the waves or something.